History of the World/History of the World (Bureau Development, Inc.)(1992).BIN/dp/0384/03845.txt

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$Title{Philosophy Of History
Preface To The First Edition.}
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$Author{Hegel, G.W.F.}
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$Date{1857}
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Title:       Philosophy Of History
Book:        Preface And Introduction
Author:      Hegel, G.W.F.
Date:        1857
Translation: Sibree, J., M.A.

Preface To The First Edition.

     The first question that suggests itself on the publication of a new
Philosophy of History is why, of all the departments of so-called Practical
Philosophy, this should have been the latest cultivated and the least
adequately discussed.  For it was not until the beginning of the eighteenth
century that Vico made the first attempt to substitute for that view of
History which regarded it either as a succession of fortuitous occurrences, or
as the supposed but not clearly recognized work of God, a conception of it as
an embodiment of primordial laws, and a product of Reason - a theory which so
far from contravening the moral freedom of humanity, posits the only
conditions in which that freedom can be developed.

     This fact can however be explained in a few brief observations.  The laws
of Being and Thought, the economy of Nature, the phenomena of the human soul,
even legal and political organisms; nor less the forms of Art and the
acknowledged manifestations of God in other modes have always passed for
stable and immutable existences, if not as far as subjective views of them are
concerned, yet certainly in their objective capacity.  It is otherwise with
the movements of History.  The extrinsic contingency which predominates in the
rise and fall of empires and of individuals, the triumphs of vice over virtue,
the confession sometimes extorted, that there have been instances in which
crimes have been productive of the greatest advantage to mankind, and that
mutability which must be regarded as the inseparable companion of human
fortunes, tend to keep up the belief that History stands on such a basis of
shifting caprice, on such an uncertain fire-vomiting volcano, that every
endeavour to discover rules, ideas, the Divine and Eternal here, may be justly
condemned as an attempt to insinuate adventitious subtleties, as the
bubble-blowing of a priori construction or a vain play of imagination.  While
men do not hesitate to admire God in the objects of Nature, it is deemed
almost blasphemy to recognize him in human exertions and human achievements;
it is supposed to be an exaltation of the disconnected results of caprice -
results which a mere change of humour might have altered - above their proper
value, to suppose a principle underlying them for which the passions of their
authors left no room in their own minds.  In short, men revolt from declaring
the products of Free-Will and of the human spirit to be eternal, because they
involve only one element of stability and consistency - the advance amid
constant mutability to a richer and more fully developed character.  An
important advance in Thought was required, a filling up of the "wide gulf"
that separates Necessity from Liberty, before a guiding hand could be
demonstrated as well as recognized in this most intractable because most
unstable element - before a Government of the World in the History of the
World could be, not merely asserted but indicated, and Spirit be regarded as
no more abandoned by God than Nature.  Before this could be done, a series of
millenniums must roll away: the work of the human spirit must reach a high
degree of perfection, before that point of view can be attained, from which a
comprehensive survey of its career is possible.  Only now, when Christendom
has elaborated an outward embodiment for its inward essence, in the form of
civilized and free states, has the time arrived not merely for a History based
on Philosophy, but for the Philosophy of History.

     One other remark must not be withheld, and which is perhaps adapted to
reconcile even the opponents of Philosophy, at least to convince them that in
the ideal comprehension of History, the original facts are not designed to be
altered or violence of any kind done them.  The remark in question has
reference to what is regarded as belonging to Philosophy in these events. Not
every trifling occurrence, not every phenomenon pertaining rather to the
sphere of individual life than to the course of the World-Spirit, is to be
"construed," as it is called, and robbed of its life and substance by a
withering formula.  There is nothing more alien to intelligence, and
consequently nothing more ridiculous than the descending to that micrology
which attempts to explain indifferent matters - which endeavours to represent
that as necessitated which might have been decided in one way quite as well as
in another, and of which in either case, he who presumes to construe the
occurrence in question, would have found an explanation.  Philosophy is
degraded by this mechanical application of its noblest organs, while a
reconciliation with those who occupy themselves with its empirical details is
thereby rendered impossible.  What is left for Philosophy to claim as its own,
consists not in the demonstration of the necessity of all occurrences, - in
regard to which, on the contrary, it may content itself with mere narration, -
but rather in removing that veil of obscurity which conceals the fact that
every considerable aggregate of nations, every important stadium of History
has an idea as its basis, and that all the transitions and developments which
the annals of the past exhibit to us, can be referred to the events that
preceded them.  In this artistic union of the merely descriptive element on
the one hand, with that which aspires to the dignity of speculation, on the
other hand, will lie the real value of a Philosophy of History.

     Again, the treatises on the Philosophy of History that have appeared
within the last hundred years or thereabouts differ in the point of view from
which they have been composed, vary with the national character of their
respective authors, and lastly, are often mere indications of a Philosophy of
History than actual elaborations of it.  For we must at the outset clearly
distinguish Philosophies from Theosophies, which latter resolve all events
directly into God, while the former unfold the manifestation of God in the
real world.  Moreover, it is evident that the Philosophies of History which
have appeared among the Italians and the French, have but little connection
with a general system of thought, as constituting one of its organic
constituents; and that their views, though often correct and striking, cannot
demonstrate their own inherent necessity.  Lastly, much has often been
introduced into the Philosophy of History that has been of a mystical,
rhapsodical order, that has not risen above a mere fugitive hint, an
undeveloped fundamental idea; and though in many cases the great merit of such
contributions cannot be denied, their place would be only in the vestibule of
our science.  We have certainly no wish to deny that among the Germans
Leibnitz, Lessing, Weguelin, Iselin, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schiller,W. von
Humboldt, ^1 Gorres, Steffens and Rosencranz, ^2 have given utterance to
observations of a profound, ingenious and permanently valuable order,
respecting both the basis of History generally and the connection that exists
between events and the spirit of which they are demonstrably the embodiment.
Among French writers, who would refuse to admire in Bossuet the refined
ecclesiastical and teleological genius which regards the History of the World
as a vast map spread out before it; in Montesquieu the prodigious talent that
makes events transform themselves instanter to thoughts in his quick
apprehension; or in Balanche and Michelet the seer's intuition that pierces
the superficial crust of circumstances and discerns the hidden forces with
which they originated?  But if actually elaborated Philosophies of History are
in question, four writers only present themselves, Vico, Herder, Fr. v.
Schlegel, ^3 and lastly the Philosopher whose work we are here introducing to
the public.

[Footnote 1: In an academic dissertation, whose style is as masterly as its
contents are profound: "On the Task of the Historian."]

[Footnote 2: In his animated and genially clever tractate: "What the Germans
have accomplished for the Philosophy of History."]

[Footnote 3: Translated in Bohn's Standard Library.]

     Vico's life and literary labours carry us back to a period in which the
elder philosophies are being supplanted by the Cartesian; but the latter has
not yet advanced beyond the contemplation of the fundamental ideas - Being and
Thought; it is not yet equipped for a descent into the concrete World of
History, or prepared to master it.  Vico, in attempting to exhibit the
principles of History in his "Scienza Nuova," is obliged to rely on the
guidance of the ancients: in his investigations it is the data of ancient
rather than of modern records that arrest his attention: Feudality and its
history is with him rather a supplement to the development of Greece and Rome
than something specifically distinct therefrom.  Although at the close of his
book he asserts that the Christian religion, even in its influence on human
aims, excels all the religions of the world, he stops short of anything like
an elaboration of this statement.  The separation and distinction between the
Middle Ages and the Modern Time cannot be exhibited, as the Reformation and
its effects are excluded from consideration.  Besides, he undertakes to
discuss the rudiments of human intelligence, Language, Poetry, Homer; as a
Jurist he has to go down into the depths of Roman Law, and to investigate
them; while all this - the main stream of thought, episodes, expansion of the
ideas and reverting to their principles - is further varied by a proneness to
hunt out etymologies and give verbal explanations, which often serves to
retard and disturb the most important processes of historical evolution.  Most
persons are thus deterred by the repulsive exterior from apprehending the
profound truths which it envelopes; the latter are not sufficiently obvious on
the surface, and the gold is thrown away with the dross that conceals it.

     In Herder we find traits of excellence which are wanting in Vico.  He is
himself a poet, and he approaches History in a poetic spirit; further he does
not detain the reader by prefatory inquiries into the foundations and
vestibules of History - Poetry, Art, Language, and Law: he begins immediately
with points of climate and geography; moreover the entire field of History
lies open before him: his liberal Protestant and cosmopolitan culture gives
him an insight into all nationalities and views, and renders him capable of
transcending mere traditional notions to an unlimited extent.  Sometimes, too,
he hits upon "the right word" with wonderful felicity; the teleological
principle on which his speculations are based does not hinder him from doing
justice to the varieties [of the actual world], and in comparing historical
periods the analogy they bear to the stages of human life does not escape him.
But these "Ideas contributory to the Philosophy of the History of Mankind"
contradict their title by the very fact that not only are all metaphysical
categories banished, but a positive hatred to metaphysics is the very element
in which they move. The Philosophy of History in Herder's hands therefore,
broken off from its proper basis, is a highly intellectual, often striking,
and on the other hand often defective "raisonnement" - a Theodicaea rather of
the Heart and Understanding than of Reason.  This alienation from its natural
root leads by necessary consequence to an enthusiasm which often obstructs the
current of thought, and to interjections of astonishment, instead of that
contention of mind which results in demonstration.  The theologian, the genial
preacher, the entranced admirer of the works of God, very often intrudes with
his subjective peculiarities amid the objectivity of History.

     In Frederick v. Schlegel's Philosophy of History we may find, if we
choose to look, a fundamental idea, which can be called a philosophical one.
It is this, namely, that Man was created free; that two courses lay before
him, between which he was competent to choose - that which led upwards, and
that which led downwards to the abyss.  Had he remained firm and true to the
primary will that proceeded from God, his freedom would have been that of
blessed spirits; that view being rejected as quite erroneous, which represents
the paradisaical condition as one of blissful idleness.  But as man unhappily
chose the second path, there was from that time forward a divine and a natural
will in him; and the great problem for the life of the individual as also for
that of the entire race, is the conversion and transformation of the lower
earthly and natural will more and more into the higher and divine will.  This
Philosophy of History, therefore, really begins with the dire and strange
lament, that there should be a history at all, and that man did not remain in
the unhistorical condition of blessed spirits. History, in this view, is an
apostasy - the obscuration of man's pure and divine being; and instead of a
possibility of discovering God in it, it is rather the Negative of God which
is mirrored in it.  Whether the race will ultimately succeed in returning
completely and entirely to God, is on this shewing only a matter of
expectation and hope, which, since humanity has once more darkened its
prospects by Protestantism, must, at least to Frederick v. Schlegel, appear
doubtful.  In elaborating the characteristic principles and historical
development of the several nations, wherever that fundamental idea retires
somewhat into the background, an intellectual platitude manifests itself,
which seeks to make up by smooth and polished diction for the frequent tenuity
of the thought.  A desire to gain repose for his own mind, to justify himself,
and to maintain the Catholic stand-point against the requirements of the
modern world, gives his treatise a somewhat far-fetched and premeditated tone,
which deprives facts of their real character to give them that tinge which
will connect them with the results they are brought forward to establish.

     Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History, to which we now come, have
at starting a great advantage over their predecessors, apart from the merits
of their contents.  First and foremost they are connected with a system of
thought logically elaborated even to its minutest members: they claim to
exhibit the Logos of History, just as there is a Logos of Nature, of the Soul,
of Law, of Art, &c.  Here, then, mere flashes of thought, mere "raisonnement,"
intelligent or unintelligent intuitions are out of the question; instead of
these we have an investigation conducted by logical philosophy in the
department of those human achievements [which constitute History].  The
categories have been already demonstrated in other branches of the System, and
the only point left to be determined is, whether they will be able also to
verify themselves in the apparently intractable element of human caprice.  But
in order that this proceeding may bring with it a guarantee of its
correctness, and I might also say, of its honesty, the occurrences themselves
are not metamorphosed by Thought, exhibited as otherwise than they really are,
or in any way altered.  The facts remain as they were - as they appear in the
historical traditions of centuries: the Idea is their expositor, not their
perverter; and while the Philosophy of History thus involves nothing more than
the comprehension of the hidden meaning of the outward phenomenon, the
philosophical art will consist in perceiving in what part of these phenomenal
data a ganglion of Ideas lies, which must be announced and demonstrated as
such; and, as in Nature every straw, every animal, every stone cannot be
deduced from general principles, so the art in question will also discern
where it should rise to the full height of speculation, or where, as remarked
above, it may be content to lose itself in the confines of the merely
superficial; it will know what is demonstration, and what is simply attached
to the demonstration as portraiture and characteristics; conscious of its
dignity and power, it will not be content to expend its labour on indifferent
circumstances.

     This is in fact one of the chief merits of the present Lectures, that
with all the speculative vigour which they display, they nevertheless concede
their due to the Empirical and Phenomenal; that they equally repudiate a
subjective raisonnement [a discussion following the mere play of individual
fancy,] and the forcing of all historical data into the mould of a formula;
that they seize and present the Idea both in logical development and in the
apparently loose and irregular course of historical narrative, but yet without
allowing this process to appear obtrusively in the latter.  The so-called a
priori method - which is, in fact, presumed to consist in 'making up' history
without the aid of historical facts - is therefore altogether different from
what is presented here; the author had no intention to assume the character of
a God, and to create History, but simply that of a man, addressing himself to
consider that History which, replete with reason and rich with ideas, had
already been created.

     The character of Lectures gives the work an additional advantage, which
it would perhaps have wanted had it been composed at the outset with a view to
publication as a book, and with the compact energy and systematic seriousness
which such a design would have involved.  Consisting of lectures, it must
contemplate an immediate apprehension of its 'meaning;' it must be intended to
excite the interest of youthful hearers, and associate what is to be presented
to their attention with what they already know.  And as of all the materials
that can be subjected to philosophic treatment, History is always the one with
whose subject persons of comparatively youthful years become earliest
acquainted, the Philosophy of History may also be expected to connect itself
with what was previously known, and not teach the subject itself as well as
the ideas it embodies, (as is the case, e.g. in Aesthetics,) but rather
confine itself to exhibiting the workings of the Idea in a material to which
the hearer is supposed to be no stranger.  If this be done in a method partly
constructive, partly merely characteristic, the advantage will be secured of
presenting to the student a readable work - one which has affinities with
ordinary intelligence, or at least is not very much removed from it.  These
Lectures therefore - and the remark is made without fear of contradiction -
would form the readiest introduction to the Hegelian Philosophy: they are even
more adapted to the purpose than the "Philosophy of Right," [or Law,] which
certainly presupposes in the student some ideas of its subject to begin with.
But the advantages of the Lecture form are not unaccompanied by the usual
drawbacks in the present case.  The necessity of developing principles at the
commencement, of embracing the entire subject, and of concluding within
definite limits, must occasion an incongruity between the first and the latter
part of the work.  The opulence of facts which the Middle Ages offer us, and
the wealth of ideas that characterizes the Modern Time, may possibly induce
dissatisfaction at the attention which, simply because it is the beginning, is
devoted to the East.

     This naturally leads us to the principles which have been adopted in the
composition of the work in its present dress; as they concern, first, its
contents, and secondly, its form.  In a lecture, the teacher endeavours to
individualize his knowledge and acquisitions: by the momentum of oral delivery
he breathes a life into his intellectual materials which a mere book cannot
possess.  Not only are digressions, amplifications, repetitions, and the
introduction of analogies which are but distantly connected with the main
subject, in place in every lecture, but without these ingredients an oral
discourse would be dry and lifeless.  That Hegel possessed this didactic gift,
notwithstanding all prejudices to the contrary, might be proved by his
manuscripts alone, which by no means contain the whole of what was actually
delivered, as also by the numerous changes and transformations that mark the
successive resumptions of an old course of lectures.  The illustrations were
not unfrequently disproportioned to the speculative matter; the beginning (and
simply because it was such) was so greatly expanded, that if all the narrative
sections, descriptions, and anecdotes had been inserted, essential detriment
would have resulted to the appearance of the book.  In the first delivery of
his lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel devoted a full third of his
time to the Introduction and to China - a part of the work which was
elaborated with wearisome prolixity.  Although in subsequent deliveries he was
less circumstantial in regard to this Empire, the editor was obliged to reduce
the description to such proportions as would prevent the Chinese section from
encroaching upon, and consequently prejudicing the treatment of, the other
parts of the work.  That kind of editorial labour which was most called for in
this part was necessary in a less degree in all the other divisions.  The
Editor had to present Lectures in the form of a Book: he was obliged to turn
oral discourse into readable matter: the notes of students and the manuscripts
which constituted his materials were of different dates; he had to undertake
the task of abridging the diffuseness of delivery, bringing the narrative
matter into harmony with the speculative observations of the author, taking
due precautions that the later lectures should not be thrust into a corner by
the earlier ones, and that the earlier ones should be freed from that aspect
of isolation and disconnection which they presented.  On the other hand, he
was bound not to forget for one moment that the book contained lectures; the
naivete, the abandon, the enthusiastic absorption in the immediate subject
which makes the speaker indifferent as to when or how he shall finish, had to
be left intact; and even frequent repetitions, where they did not too much
interrupt the course of thought, or weary the reader, could not be altogether
obliterated.

     But notwithstanding the full measure of license, which in the nature of
the case must be conceded to the Editor, and the reconstructive duties imposed
upon him by compilation, it can be honestly averred that in no case have the
ideas of the compiler been substituted for those of Hegel, - that a genuine,
altogether unadulterated work of the great philosopher is here offered to the
reader, and that, if the editor had followed another plan, no choice would
have been left him but either to produce a book which none could have enjoyed,
or, on the other hand, to insert too much of his own in place of the materials
that lay before him.

     As regards the style of the work, it must be observed that the Editor was
obliged to write it out from beginning to end.  For one part of the
Introduction however, (as far as p. 61 of this book) he had ready to hand an
elaboration begun by Hegel in 1830, which though it was not designed expressly
for publication, was manifestly intended to take the place of earlier
Introductions.  The Editor - though all his friends did not adopt his view of
the matter - believed that where a Hegelian torso was in existence, he ought
to refrain from all interpolations of his own and from revisional alterations.
He was desirous not to weaken the firm phalanx of the Hegelian style by
introducing phrases of any other stamp or order, even at the risk of being
thus obliged to forego a certain unity of expression.  He thought that it
could not be otherwise than gratifying to the reader to encounter - at least
through some part of the book - the strong, pithy and sometimes gnarled style
of the author; he wished to afford him the pleasure of pursuing the
labyrinthine windings of thought under the guidance of his often less than
flexible but always safe and energetic hand.  From the point at which these
elaborated fragments ceased, began the real task of giving the work an
integral form; but this was performed with constant regard for the peculiar
terms of expression which the manuscripts and notes exhibited: the Editor
gladly exchanged the words which offered themselves to his own pen for others
which he would perhaps not have preferred himself, but which seemed to him
more characteristic of the author; only where it was absolutely necessary has
he been willing to complete, to fill up, to supplement; in short he has been
anxious as far as possible to make no sort of change in the peculiar type of
the composition, and to offer to the public not a book of his own but that of
another.  The Editor cannot therefore become responsible for its expression,
as if it were his own; he had to present a material and trains of thought not
his own, and as far as possible to avoid travelling far out of the limits of
that order of phrases in which they were originally clothed. Only within these
given and predetermined conditions, which are at the same time impediments to
a free style, can the Editor be made accountable.

     Hegel's manuscripts were the first materials to which the Editor had
recourse.  These often contain only single words and names connected by
dashes, evidently intended to aid the memory in teaching; then again longer
sentences, and sometimes a page or more fully written out.  From this latter
part of the manuscript could be taken many a striking expression, many an
energetic epithet: the hearers' notes were corrected and supplemented by it,
and it is surprising with what unwearied perseverance the author continually
returns to former trains of thought.  Hegel appears in these memorials as the
most diligent and careful teacher, always intent upon deepening fugitive
impressions, and clenching what might pass away from the mind, with the strong
rivets of the Idea.  As regards the second part of my materials, the notes, I
have had such - reporting all the five deliveries of this course, 18 22/23, 18
24\25, 18 26\27, 18 28\29, 18 30\31 ^1 - in the hand-writing of Geh.
Ober-Regierungs Rath Schulze, Capt. von Griesheim, Prof. Hotho, Dr. Werder,
Dr. Heinmann, and the son of the philosopher, M. Charles Hegel.  It was not
till the session of 18 30\31 that Hegel came to treat somewhat more largely of
the Middle Ages and the Modern Time, and the sections of the present work
devoted to those periods are for the most part taken from this last delivery
of the course.  To many of my respected colleagues and friends, whom I would
gladly name if I might presume upon their permission to do so, I am indebted
for emendations, additions, and assistance of every kind. Without such aids,
the book would be much less complete as regards the historical illustration of
principles than it may perhaps be deemed at present.

[Footnote 1: These lectures were delivered in the University of Berlin, to
which Hegel was called in 1818.  "He there lectured for thirteen years, and
formed a school, of which it is sufficient to name as among its members, Gans,
Rosenkranz, Michelet, Werder, Marheineke and Hotho." Lewes's Biog. Hist. of
Philos. - Tr.]

     With this publication of the "Philosophy of History," that of the
"Aesthetik" within a few months, and that of the "Encyclopadie" in its new
form and style, which will not have long to be waited for, the work of editing
and publishing Hegel's writings will be completed.  For our Friend and Teacher
it will be a monument of fame; for the editors a memorial of piety, whose
worth and truth consist not in womanish lamentation, but in a grief that is
only a stimulus to renewed activity.  On the other hand that piety desires no
return but the satisfaction which it already possesses in the consciousness of
the performance of duty; and though those who are "dead while they live" may
think to reproach us with the feebleness of our means, we may hope for
absolution in consideration of the plenitude of our zeal. The Hegelian Four
Ages of the World have at least made their appearance.

     Edward Gans.

     Berlin, June 8, 1837.